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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HAROLD S. S2\NDERS and ELEANOR
SANDERS,

)_

l
)_

Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
DONNE. CASSITY, Trustee, et al.,

)_

Case No. 15515

l
l
l
l
)_

Defendants-Appellant.

l

APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
POINTS Wh""EREIN IT IS ALLEGED THE SUPREME COURT ERRED:
POINT I
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED BY ASSUMING THAT LEODA
DUNHAM WAS A QUALIFIED HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD, AND THEREFORE ENTITLED TO A HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION AT THE TIME
THAT APPELLANT'S JUDGMENT WAS DOCKETED. THIS ASSUMED
FACT HAS NO FOUNDATION IN THE RECORD ON APPEAL NOR
IN ANY EVIDE11TIARY MATERIAL SUBMITTED IN THESE PROCEEDINGS.
On appeal appellant argued that his judgment of May 14,
1971, created a judgment lien on the property of Leoda

Dunham which was not affected by Leoda Dunham's subsequent
homestead declaration.

In support of his position, appellant

cited the court to Evans v. Jensen, 168 P 762

(Utah 1917), a
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case which held that a subsequent change of status (becoming
the head of the householdi after the lien attached to the
property could not be used to defeat the existing mechanic's
lien.
In its decision filed October 13, 1978, this court apparently in support of this position embraces the rule, as
held previously in Evans, that a pre-existing lien cannot
be defeated by a subsequent change in status which qualifies
the land owner to take advantage of a homestead exemption.
This court also referred to 40 AM,' Jur. 2nd

Homestead Sec. 94

Having adopted this standard., the court then stated:
" •••. Dunham was qualified as head of the household and was entitled to the exemption before the
judgment lien was recorded .•... " p. 3.
In making this statement the court assumed a fact which
is not before it and which is not in the record on appeal.

The evidence of Leoda Dunham's status as a head of
household is as follows:
1.

Pleadings - Leoda Dunham made her declaration

of homestead on September 10, 1972, and recorded
it on September 11, 1972.

Nothing in the pleadings

indicates that Leoda Dunham was qualified as a
head of household prior to the date the declaration
was made.
2.

Declaration Of Homestead (Part of Record on

Appeal by Stipulation of the parties) -

-5-
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declaration states that Leoda Dunham's blind brother
lives with her, without stating when he came to live
with her, and further states that her husband is dead.
Nothing therein indicates when she acquired the status
of a head of household.
This evidence does not support the contention that Leoda
Dunham was a head of household on or about May 14, 1971, when
appellant's judgment was docketed.
Respondents have the duty to prove that the judgment lien
of appellant did not attach to the remainder interest they
acquired from Leoda Dunham.

" 'He who sets up an exemption

must prove it.'" Giesy - Walker Co. v. Briggs, 162 P 876, 878
(Utah 19161.

Therefore, because no evidence has been placed

before the court to show that Leoda Dunham was a head of
household at the time appellant's judgment was docketed, respondents have failed to carry their burden of proof.
For the reason that there is no evidence before the court
upon which the court could base its determination that Leoda
Dunham was a head of household on May 14, 1971, this court
must hold that Leoda Dunham did in fact not hold such status,
that appellant's judgment created a lien on her property
which was not affected by Leoda Dunham's subsequent homestead
declaration, that respondents acquired Leoda Dunham's remainder
interest subject to appellant's judgment lien, and that the
sheriff's sale to foreclose that lien was proper.

-6-
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POINT II
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED BY IMPROPERLY PLACING A
DUTY UPON APPELLANT TO CONTEST THE DECLARED VALUE OF
THE HOMESTEAD PROPERTY OF LEODA DUNHAM, AS SET FORTH
IN HER HOMESTEAD DECLARATION, AT THE TIME THE DECLARATION WAS RECORDED. THE IMPROPER IMPOSITION OF
THIS DUTY WAS THE BASIS FOR THE COURT'S FINDING
THAT APPELLANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO CONTEST THE DECLARED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN THESE PROCEEDINGS.
Appellant argued that the lower court's determination as
to the value of the homestead property of Leoda Dunham at the
time she conveyed it was in error.

He argued to this court

that a trial should be held to determine whether it in fact
had a value in excess of the homestead amount at the time
Leoda Dunham conveyed a remainder interest to respondents.
Appellant's judgment lien would have attached to any excess
value over the homestead amount.

Giesy - Walker Co. v. Briggs.

This court held that appellant is estopped to question th1
value of the property interests.

The court said:

" .•• any objection to the value stated should
have been raised at the time Dunham recorded her declaration of homestead interest ... " p. 4
In reaching this decision, the court referred to the fact
that appellant's failure to question the value "in the earlier
proceeding constitutes a waiver''.

The court, however, does

not indicate to what "earlier proceeding" it refers.
There was no earlier proceeding!

The record on appeal

contains no reference to any earlier proceeding.

-7-
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It can only

be assumed that this court is referring to the sheriff's sale
which was to take place on September 13, 1972, two days after
Leoda ~unham recorded her homestead declaration.
The first opportunity that might have arisen to question
the value of the homestead property would have been the sheriff's
sale of September 13, 1972.

If the homestead declarant and the

officer conducting the sale had disagreed as to the value
of the property, then appraisers would have been appointed to
determine the true value.

U.C.A., 1953, 28-1-16.

This opportunity to question the value of the homestead
property never materialized.

The sheriff's sale was never held.

The record on appeal discloses no reasons why the sale was
not held.

Respondent's counsel has speculated upon oral

argument before this court and the court below that the sale
did not occur because of Leoda Dunham's homestead declaration.
Appellants' counsel, on the other hand, represented upon oral
argument to the court below and to this court his belief and
understanding that the sale was cancelled due to a faulty
notice.

Nevertheless, this court should look only to the

record before it, and that record discloses no reason.

There-

fore, this court should not speculate that appellant was aware
of the homestead aeclaration or that he had an opportunity to
contest the value as set forth therein by Leoda DUr.tham.

-8-
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Further,

appellant had no duty to contest the value as it is the duty of
the officer conducting the sale and the homestead declara1t1t to
determine this issue.

U.C.A., 1953, 28-1-16.

Not only does this court err in supposing that appellant
waived his right to contest the value of the homestead property,
but its holding places an impossible burden on judgment credito 1
it fails to consider the probability that the value of the home·
stead property will increase, and it invites abuse of the
homestead act.
The effect of this court's holding is that judgment
creditors must contest the declared value of homestead property
at the time a declaration of homestead is recorded or thereafter
lose this right.

In order to fulfill this duty a judgment

creditor will have to continuously review the records of the
County Recorder for the County wherein the judgment debtor
owns realty, for if he should fail to discover that a homestead declaration had been filed at any time before a forced
sale, he would be bound by the value of the property as set
forth therein.

This result would occur, under this court's

decision, even where the homestead declaration had been filed
years before a sheriff's sale is noticed and takes place.
an impractical and prohibitively expensive burden is placed
on a judgment creditor by the court's holding.
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Thus

The court's holding also fails to take into account that
the value of the homestead property may increase above the
amount of the homestead exemption.

In the context of this

case, appellant is contesting the value of the property at
the time it was conveyed by Leoda Dunham, not when the declaration of homestead was made.

This court's holding prohibits

appellant from questioning the value of the property at the
time it was conveyed to respondents because he failed to
contest the value when the homestead declaration was recorded.
It does not take into account the possibility that the value
of her property increased above the homestead exemption in the
interim between the date the declaration of homestead was
recorded and the date the property was conveyed.

The possibility

exists that such an increase would occur, but under the court's
holding, a judgment creditor would be unable to take advantage
of the increase if he failed to discover and contest the
value of the property as set forth in the homestead declaration
which may have been filed months or years before.
Further, the court's holding encourages land owners to
file homestead declarations disclosing that the value of the
described property is less than the exempt amount when in
fact it is not.

Should a judgment creditor months, or years,

thereafter seek to have his judgment satisfied at a sheriff's
sale by executing upon the value in excess of the exemption,
the homestead claimant could claim that the creditor waived
his ·right to claim that any excess value existed because he
failed to contest the value as set forth in the declaration.
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The foregoing demonstrate the effect of the court's
holding herein that appellant is estopped to question the
value of the homestead property.

It should be noted that

appellant's first opportunity to contest the value of the
property arose in the proceedings below whereat appellant
showed the lower court that respondent's evidence of value
was incompetent and self serving, and that a genuine issue
existed as to the value of the property at the time
Leoda Dunham conveyed the remainder interest to respondents.
Appellant has not waived his right, nor should he be estopped.
This court should remand this matter to the lower court for
a determination of the value of the property at the time it
was conveyed to respondents.
POINT III
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO ADDRESS
A MATERIAL ISSUE ON THIS APPEAL, I.E. WHETHER LEODA
DUNHAM RETAINED HER HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION OR CONVEYED
IT TO RESPONDENTS.
This court held in substance that the property interest
conveyed to respondents by Leoda Dunham was free and clear of
appellant's judgment lien by operation of law because the
value of Leoda Dunham's interest immediately prior to the
conveyance was less than the homestead exemption amount.
court held that appellant waived his right to contest the
value of the

pro~erty,

which holding appellant assigns as
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The

error in Point II of this brief,

If this court decides, upon

rehearing, that appellant is not precluded from seeking a
determination of the value of the property, then it should
also modify its opinion with respect to the question of
whether the homestead exemption was conveyed.

In the event

the property is determined to have a value in excess of the
exempt amount, then the question of whether the homestead
exemption was conveyed or retained by Leoda Dunham is material
and must be answered.
SUMMARY
The Supreme Court should reconsider its opinion herein.

It

should recognize that it erred in holding that Leoda Dunham was
a head of household at the time appellant's judgment was docketed, and that this error led to an erroneous conclusion, namely,
that appellant's judgment lien was defeated by her subsequent
homestead declaration.

It should also recognize that it erred

in holding that appellant waived his right to contest the value
of the homestead property by failing to raise the issue at the
time Leoda Dunham recorded her homestead declaration, when in
fact he had no opportunity to raise such question, and ~ven
if he had, it would .have been raised prematurely since the
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critical point in time was the date Leoda Dunham conveyed a
remainder interest to respondents.

This court should also

recognize that it erred in holding that there was no need to
determine whether Leoda Dunham retained or conveyed her homestead exemption, which holding was based upon the conclusion
that the value of Leoda Dunham's interest immediately before
the conveyance was less than the exemption amount, when the
value of Leoda Dunham's property interest has not been determL
Therefore, appellant requests that the court reconsider its
opinion herein, and thereafter issue an opinion in accordance
with the facts of this case and the law applicable thereto.

301

Respectively submitted this

day of October, 1978.

~OMNEY,

NELSON & CASSITY
Attorneys for Appellant
136 South Main Street
Suite 404 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

-:>/!
/L'

day of October, 1978,

I mailed 3 true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant'~
Petition For Rehearing and Brief In Support of Petition For
Rehearing to Bill Thomas Peters, attorney for Respondent, at
his office at Ti9bals and Staten, 400 Chancellor Building,
220 South 2nd East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111.
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